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Failure of Equilibrium Selection Methods for Multiple-Principal,
Multiple-Agent Problems with Non-Rivalrous Goods:
An Analysis of Data Markets
Samir Wadhwa and Roy Dong
Abstract—The advent of machine learning tools has led to
the rise of data markets. These data markets are characterized
by multiple data purchasers interacting with a set of data
sources. Data sources have more information about the quality
of data than the data purchasers; additionally, data itself is a
non-rivalrous good that can be shared with multiple parties at
negligible marginal cost. In this paper, we study the multiple-
principal, multiple-agent problem with non-rivalrous goods.
Under the assumption that the principal’s payoff is quasilinear
in the payments given to agents, we show that there is a
fundamental degeneracy in the market of non-rivalrous goods.
Specifically, for a general class of payment contracts, there will
be an infinite set of generalized Nash equilibria. This multiplic-
ity of equilibria also affects common refinements of equilibrium
definitions intended to uniquely select an equilibrium: both
variational equilibria and normalized equilibria will be non-
unique in general. This implies that most existing equilibrium
concepts cannot provide predictions on the outcomes of data
markets emerging today. The results support the idea that
modifications to payment contracts themselves are unlikely to
yield a unique equilibrium, and either changes to the models of
study or new equilibrium concepts will be required to determine
unique equilibria in settings with multiple principals and a non-
rivalrous good.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread adoption of machine learning tools has led
to data becoming a marketable good in its own right. This has
led to the rise of data markets where companies and people
can put forth payment contracts to incentivize workers to
harvest data. Several platforms act as intermediaries in this
exchange, such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk, Witkey, and
Terbine.
The exchange of data often gives rise to problems of
asymmetric information. In these exchanges, the data seller
has more information about the quality of data than the data
purchaser. This asymmetric information often gets modeled
in a principal-agent setting: the principal (data purchaser)
wishes to incentivize the agent (data source) to harvest and
share high quality data, but cannot directly observe the
quality of data or the effort exerted when harvesting data.
Additionally, data as a good is special: it is a non-rivalrous
good. (This is also sometimes referred to as a public good in
the economics literature.) Once data is produced, it can be
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shared with multiple data purchasers at negligible marginal
cost. Non-rivalrous goods often lead to externalities between
agents, and thus free-riding and social inefficiencies are a
common consequence [1]. Data markets are no exception [2].
Finally, as data increases in importance, multiple firms will
attempt to enter the data market. This leads to our problem
formulation, where multiple principals (data purchasers) in-
teract with the same set of agents (data sources) to incentivize
the collection and sharing of a non-rivalrous good.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to generally study the
structure of multiple-principal, multiple-agent problems with
non-rivalrous goods. We look at a general class of payment
functions, and show that whenever the principal’s payoffs
are quasilinear in the payments given, there will be an
infinite number of generalized Nash equilibria. Additionally,
neither the variational equilibria concept nor the normal-
ized equilibria concept can act as an equilibrium selection
method: we show that both these equilibrium concepts will
yield a multiplicity of equilibria. These results point at a
fundamental ambiguity that exists under very mild conditions
for the multiple-principal, multiple-agent problem when the
underlying good produced is non-rivalrous.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we contextualize our contributions among the existing lit-
erature. In Section III, we outline our model and formally
state our problem of study. Additionally, we show how
our model includes some recently studied models for data
markets as a special case. In Section IV, we introduce
the equilibrium concepts that will be applied throughout
the paper. In Section V, we prove that multiple-principal,
multiple-agent problems with non-rivalrous goods will have
an infinite number of generalized Nash equilibria, variational
equilibria, and normalized equilibria. This section contains
the main theoretical contributions of this paper. We provide
closing remarks in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The most relevant work in this area can be divided into the
categories: 1) the study of principal-agent problems with a
single principal, 2) the study of multiple-principal, multiple
agent problems, and 3) the literature on equilibrium selection
methods.
In principal-agent problems with a single principal, the
strategic response of agents to a payment contract is studied
to design contract mechanisms. These works seek to en-
sure truthful reporting from agents while maximizing the
principal’s utility. In [3], a peer-prediction based contract
mechanism is developed for a single data purchaser buying
data from multiple data sellers. In [4], an electricity market
where a single purchaser acquires electricity from multiple
sources to satisfy its demand is studied. [4] investigates the
properties of equilibrium in this scenario and shows how
local incentive compatibility (where agents only deviate in
a neighbourhood of their true preferences) can be achieved.
An electricity market where an electricity producer supplies
to a large number of consumers with stochastic demand is
studied in [5].
In problems with multiple principals, the added effect of
coupling between the decisions of the principals and their
effect on the agent’s response is studied. In [6], spectrum
markets with multiple buyers and sellers is modeled as
a finite horizon dynamic game and optimal behaviour is
determined using a combination of short-term and long-term
contracts. Data markets with multiple buyers and multiple
sellers considering data as a non-rivalrous good are studied
in [2] and the existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is
shown. In [7], failure of the revelation principle in the
multiple-principal multiple-agent scenario when principals
can resort to a complex communication scheme is shown.
In [8], the agent’s strategy to contract only a subset of
principals in order to maximize its utility is studied.
The literature on equilibrium selection focuses on re-
finement of equilibrium concepts due to the issue of mul-
tiplicity of equilibria that often plagues generalized Nash
equilibrium (GNE) problems. Variational equilibrium (VE)
and normalized equilibrium (NoE) are the most popular
equilibrium selection methods. [9] provides sufficient con-
ditions for ensuring that VE is a refinement to GNE. In [10]
sufficient conditions for equivalence of VE and NoE are
presented, however these conditions do not necessarily hold
in our model and we treat the two as independent selec-
tion methods. Quasi-Nash equilibrium and constrained Nash
equilibrium as selection methods are introduced in [11]
and [12]. [12] shows the relationship of a constrained Nash
equilibrium with VE and GNE. [13] shows that under the
linear independent constraint qualification, the quasi-Nash
equilibrium coincides with NoE for their model.
Our work is aimed at studying the consequences of non-
rivalrous nature of data in realistic data markets with multiple
buyers and multiple sellers. We generalize this study to
a market with any non-rivalrous good and show that the
nature of the good leads to an infinite number of generalized
Nash equilibria. Furthermore, this set cannot be refined
by the concepts of variational equilibrum or normalized
equilibrium.
We model this scenario as a two-stage game. In the
first stage principals decide on contract parameters and in
the second stage, agents decide their efforts based on the
contracts available to them. We show that for all quasilinear
payment contracts that induce a unique dominant strategy
equilibrium amongst the agents, this game does not admit
a unique solution and the principal bearing the cost of the
public good is uncertain. Payment contracts of this form are
commonly used in crowdsourcing [2], [14], [15], [16].
Our results substantiate the idea that modification to
payment contracts are unlikely to admit a unique equilibrium
and changes in modeling techniques or new equilibrium con-
cepts will be required for analysis of settings with multiple
principals and a non-rivalrous good.
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we introduce our model for the multiple-
principal, multiple-agent problem with a non-rivalrous good,
and state the problem of equilibrium selection. Before we
present the details in full, we provide a high-level overview
of our model.
The structure of the interaction is as follows. First, let
B = {1, . . . ,M} denote the set of principals and let N =
{1, . . . , N} denote the set of agents1. Each principal j ∈
B announces payment contracts (pji )i∈N , where p
j
i is the
payment contract offered to agent i ∈ N . The principals
announce their payment contracts simultaneously. Based on
the payment contracts, the agents choose to exert some effort
to produce a good. The more effort an agent exerts, the
higher the quality of good they produce. This good is non-
rivalrous in nature, and all principals derive some value from
the production of the good.
One example of a non-rivalrous good is data. Once an
agent produces data of a certain quality, they can infinitely
share this data with multiple principals; sharing their data
with one more principal has negligible marginal cost. Thus,
our framework captures many interactions that take place in
crowdsourcing applications, and the model encompasses the
payment contracts used by [2], [14], [15] and [16].
An issue in this interaction is the asymmetric information
between the principals and the agents. That is, the principals
cannot directly observe the effort exerted by agents, and
the payment contracts must be functions of some observable
quantity, rather than the exerted effort. In our motivating data
markets example, a principal may not know the variance of
the reported data’s distribution, but they know the realized
value of the reported data. The asymmetric information be-
tween principals and agents motivates the need for incentive-
compatible payment contracts, to motivate the agents to exert
effort in producing the good.
A. Model
In this subsection, we will introduce the payoff functions
for the principals and the agents, as well as the payment
contracts under consideration.
First, let us introduce the notation to be used throughout
this section. For each agent i ∈ N , let ei ∈ R denote the
effort exerted by agent i, and let e = (ei)i∈N denote the
vector of efforts. Furthermore, each principal j ∈ B does
1We use B to denote the set of principals as they are the ‘data buyers’
in our motivating application, and to avoid confusion with the payment
contracts p.
not directly observe the efforts e, but rather observes some
(potentially random) function of the efforts, yj(e).
Assumption 1 (Payment structure). We consider payment
contracts of the following form, where the payment from
principal j to agent i is parameterized by (cji , a
j
i ):
p
j
i (y
j(e); cji , a
j
i ) = c
j
i + h
j(aji , y
j(e))
For notational simplicity, we will combine hj and yj into a
single (potentially random) function f j:
p
j
i (y
j(e); cji , a
j
i ) = c
j
i + f
j(aji , e)
We assume f j : (aji , e) 7→ E[f
j(aji , e)] is a continuously
differentiable function.
Note that the payment to agent i depends on the entire
effort vector e. In other words, the payment received by
agent i is affected by the efforts exerted by the other
agents. Put another way, the payment contracts induce a
game between the agents. Payment contracts of this form
are studied in [2], [14], [15] and [16].
Now, let us consider the agent’s payoffs.
Assumption 2 (Agent model). We assume that the agent’s
utility function is quasilinear in efforts and payments re-
ceived; that is, for each agent i, their payoff is given by:
ui(e) =
∑
j∈B
p
j
i (y
j(e); cji , a
j
i )− ei
When selecting ei, the agent knows the functions p
j
i and y
j .
As mentioned previously, our model captures a non-
rivalrous good, so once agent i exerts effort ei, every
principal will derive some value from the produced good.
Consequently, once agent i exerts effort ei, they will receive
payments from all the principals.
Next, let us consider the principal’s payoffs. Let cj =
(cji )i and a
j = (aji )i denote the vector of payment contract
parameters for all agents i. Similarly, let c = (cj)j and a =
(aj)j denote the matrices of the contract parameter vectors
across all principals j.
Assumption 3 (Principal’s loss function). The cost of each
principal j is given by:
Lj(c
j , aj ; e) =
∑
i∈N
p
j
i (y
j(e); cji , a
j
i )− v
j(e)
Here, vj is a (potentially random) function, and we assume
v
j : e 7→ E[vj(e)] is a continuously differentiable function.
The cost for each principal is the sum of all payments
made by this principal to the agents, minus the value received
when the agents exert effort e. In a data markets setting,
vj(e) can represent the quality of statistical inference when
the reported dataset is yj(e).
Assumption 4 (Risk neutrality). We will assume that the
principals and agents make their decisions ex-ante. In other
words, the principals must decide (cj , aj) and the agents
must decide e prior to the realization of the (yj(e)) (and
thus prior to the realization of the payment values) as well
as vj(e), the value derived from the goods.
Furthermore, all parties are risk-neutral, so their ex-ante
decisions are made to optimize the expected value of their
cost:
E[ui(e)] =
∑
j∈B
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , e)
)
− ei (1)
E[Lj(c
j , aj; e)] =
∑
i∈N
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , e)
)
− vj(e) (2)
Thus, this setting can be thought of as a two-stage game.
In the first stage, the principals decide the payment contract
parameters (c, a) = (cj , aj)j∈B . In the second stage, the
agents decide the effort levels e = (ei)i∈N . Put another way,
in the first stage, the principals choose payment contracts that
jointly determine which game is induced between the agents
in the second stage.
Finally, we outline desirable properties for our payment
contracts.
We wish to have voluntary participation of the agents.
Formally, this means that their ex-ante utilities should be
positive. We will refer to ‘ex-ante individual rationality’ as
simply ‘individual rationality’ throughout this paper.
Definition 1 (Individual rationality). The payment contracts
are individually rational with respect to an effort level e∗ if,
for every i ∈ N :
E[ui(e
∗)] ≥ 0
Whereas individual rationality incentivizes participation,
each principal must almost incentivize the agents to share
the non-rivalrous good with them. Thus, we have another
desirable condition.
Definition 2 (Ex-ante positive payments). The payment
contracts are positive with respect to an effort level e∗ if,
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ B:
E[pji (y
j(e); cj , aj)] ≥ 0
The last desirable property is stability of chosen effort
levels e∗. In our case, we enforce that e∗ must be a dominant
strategy equilibrium between the agents. Intuitively, this
means that each agent’s payoff is maximized by choosing
e∗i , regardless of the effort levels e−i chosen by other agents.
Definition 3 (Dominant strategy equilibrium). For the sec-
ond stage, we say e∗ is a dominant strategy equilibrium for
payment contract parameters (c, a) if for any i and any other
potential effort vector e:
E[ui(e
∗
i , e−i)] ≥ E[ui(e)] (3)
We say e∗ is unique if no other e′ satisfies this property.
This provides our desired behavior in the second stage
of the game: the payment contracts should induce a unique
dominant strategy equilibrium e∗, and e∗ should be individ-
ually rational and have positive payments in expectation.
Our problem statement concerns the first stage of the
game. Given this enforced structure on the second stage
(i.e. the interaction between agents), how can we specify the
behavior of the principals in the first stage? In addition to the
constraints on the payment contracts outlined, the contract
parameters (c, a) must be chosen to minimize the principal’s
cost in some sense.
Importantly, having uniqueness of some equilibrium con-
cept for this would provide insight into what outcomes to
expect in real world applications such as data markets.
Problem Statement. What equilibrium selection methods
can uniquely identify payment contract parameters (c, a) and
an induced effort level e∗?
To be a reasonable model for interactions between strategic
parties, the parameters (c, a) should form some equilibrium
concept in the first stage between principals. Additionally,
the resulting payment contracts must satisfy these properties
in the second stage: the payment contracts induce a unique
dominant strategy equilibrium e∗ between agents, and be
individually rational with respect to e∗, with positive ex-ante
payments.
Our paper shows that the most common equilibrium con-
cepts and refinements fail to uniquely select an equilibrium
in this problem setting. There is a fundamental ambiguity
in multiple-principal, multiple-agent problems with non-
rivalrous goods, due to the ambiguity in which principals
can free-ride off others, and neither variational equilibrium
or normalized equilibria can resolve this ambiguity.
B. Example: effort-averse data sources in data markets
In this subsection, we show how our framework encap-
sulates the model of a data market presented in [2]. In this
setting, the principals are data aggregators and the agents
are effort-averse data sources. A data source produces data
by drawing one data sample from a distribution; the higher
the level of effort, the lower the variance of the underlying
distribution. The data aggregators have access to the reported
data, but not the variance of the distributions that generated
the data.
More formally, in this example, the data aggregators are
trying to estimate some function φ. Each data source i ∈ N
generates a data point at xi:
yi(ei) = φ(xi) + ǫi
Here, ǫi is zero mean noise with variance σ
2
i (ei). The
variance σ2i (ei) decreases as the effort ei increases.
In this case, the data aggregators issue payments of the
form:
p
j
i (y; c
j
i , a
j
i ) = c
j
i − a
j
i (yi − φ̂−i(xi; y−i))
2
Here, φ̂−i is the leave-one-out estimator [3], where φ(xi)
is estimated using every other data source’s data y−i. Intu-
itively, this setting uses the other data sources −i to generate
an estimate of what data source i should be reporting.
The term on the right decomposes into two independent
terms: one which increases the payment when the variance
decreases, and another term which agent i has no control
over.
In this example:
f
j = −ajiE[(yi − φ̂−i(xi))
2]
From the perspective of the data aggregators, their loss is
a combination of three terms: a penalty for poor statistical
estimation, the cost of payments issued, and an optional
penalty for the estimation quality of competing firms. For
simplicity, we consider the estimation loss at a single point
x:
E[Lj((c
j , aj))] = E[(φ(x) − φ̂j(x))2]
−
∑
k 6=j
ζ
j
kE[(φ(x) − φ̂
k(x))2] +
∑
i∈N
E[pji ]
Here, (ζjk)k ≥ 0 are parameters that act as weights in this
loss function. Thus, in this example:
v
j = −E[(φ(x) − φ̂j(x))2] +
∑
k 6=j
ζ
j
kE[(φ(x) − φ̂
k(x))2]
Note that vj depends on e through the realized data
(yk(e))k∈B and the resulting estimators (φ̂
k)k∈B .
We note that there are several other approaches to incentive
design for strategic data sources which similarly fall into our
framework. For example, in [14], rather than using a leave-
one-out estimator, the authors assume access to queries of
known quality, referred to as ‘gold standard’ queries.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
With our model in place, in this section, we introduce
the equilibrium concepts we consider. In Section V, we will
show that none of these concepts will successfully determine
a unique set of parameters (c, a).
First, let us introduce some notations. Let Pe(e∗) denote
the set of payment contract parameters such that e∗ is
a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, and the payment
contracts are individually rational and positive with respect to
e∗. Similarly, let P = ∪e∗Pe(e
∗) denote the set of payment
contracts such that there exists an e∗ that satisfies these
properties.
We introduce the function µ, which maps payment contract
parameters to the dominant strategy effort levels. Note that
if a payment contract induces a unique dominant strategy
equilibrium between agents, this equilibrium depends only
on the a parameters. That is, the parameters c have no effect
on the value of the dominant strategy equilibrium.
More formally, let µ : P → RN denote the mapping from
payment contract parameters (c, a) to the dominant strategy
equilibrium e∗.
Proposition 1. The mapping from contract parameters (c, a)
to the dominant strategy equilibrium e∗ depends only on a.
That is, the function µ(·, a) is constant on P .
Proof. By combining Equations (3) and (1), we can see that
e∗ is a dominant strategy equilibrium if and only if:∑
j∈B
f
j(aji , (e
∗
i , e−i)) ≥
∑
j∈B
f
j(aji , e)
The desired result follows.
In light of Proposition 1, we will use the notation µ(a)
without any loss of generality, dropping the c argument
entirely.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 holds because the parameters c
act as a constant shift and do not affect the strategic nature
of the game at all. Indeed, one can thinking of this as
follows: the inclusion of the c parameters ensures individual
rationality while the inclusion of the a parameters ensures
the dominant strategy equilibrium is as desired.
Now, we can introduce the concept of generalized Nash
equilibrium. The introduction of µ allows us to note how the
dominant strategy effort levels e∗ vary with the a parameters
in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) [10]). A
set of contract parameters (c, a) form a generalized Nash
equilibrium for the first stage of the game if for every j,
(cj , aj) solves the minimization problem:
min
(cj ,aj)
E[L(cj , aj ;µ(a))] (4)
s.t. (c, a) ∈ P
In other words, holding the other agent’s actions con-
stant, (cj , aj) minimizes the principal j’s cost subject to
the constraint that (c, a) induce a unique dominant strategy
equilibrium that is individually rational and ex-ante positive.
It is not uncommon that games admit an infinite set of
GNEs [12]. This has motivated the refinements of equilib-
rium concepts. We present two here: the variational equilib-
rium and normalized equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Variational equilibria (VE) [9]). We say (c, a)
is a variational equilibrium if (c, a) ∈ P and, for any (c˜, a˜) ∈
P: ∇(c1,a1)E[L1(c
1, a1;µ(a))]
...
∇(cM ,aM)E[LM (c
M , aM ;µ(a))]

⊺
[(c˜, a˜)− (c, a)] ≥ 0
Furthermore, note that µ allows us to write the set P in
terms of a finite number of constraints:
P = {(c, a) : E[ui(µ(a))] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , (5)
E[pji (µ(a))] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ B}
Thus, the constraint set in Equation (4) can be thought of as
a finite number of inequality constraints, and admits a finite
number of Lagrange multipliers. This allows us to introduce
another equilibrium refinement method.
Definition 6 (Normalized equilibria (NoE) [17]). Let γ ∈
R
B
+. Let λ
j denote the KKT multipliers from the Equation (4)
for principal j. We say a GNE is a normalized equilibrium
with weights γ if the KKT multipliers λj satisfy the normal-
ization condition:
γ1λ
1 = γ2λ
2 = · · · = γMλ
M
V. FAILURE OF EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
In this section, we outline why the equilibrium concepts in
Section IV fail to uniquely select an equilibrium for multiple-
principal, multiple-agent problems with a non-rivalrous good.
The inability of variational equilibria to select a unique
GNE in Section V-B and the non-uniqueness of normalized
equilibria in Section V-C are the main results of this paper.
In doing so, we highlight fundamental degeneracies when
multiple principals attempt to incentivize multiple agents to
produce a non-rivalrous good.
A. Non-uniqueness of GNE
First, we note one property which is the underlying reason
why the aforementioned equilibrium selection methods fail.
Whenever the principal’s loss function is quasilinear in the
payments given, the individual rationality constraints are
always binding at generalized Nash equilibria. This is given
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let (c, a) be any generalized Nash equi-
librium with associated effort level e∗. Then the individual
rationality constraints are binding. That is:
E[ui(e
∗)] =
∑
j∈B
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , e
∗)
)
− e∗i = 0
Proof. Suppose there exists an i ∈ N such that the individual
rationality constraint is not binding. Define si as:
si =
∑
j∈B
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , e
∗)
)
− e∗i > 0
Then, any principal j can decrease their loss by changing
from c
j
i to c
j
i − si. Thus, (c, a) is not an optimizer of
Equation (4), and cannot be a GNE.
Now, we will explicitly calculate the simplex of general-
ized Nash equilibria for the game between principals. It is
common for GNE to not be unique, and, in fact, for there to
be a manifold of GNEs. This lack of uniqueness is one of
the commonly stated issues in the study of GNEs [12], and
has motivated the study of equilibrium refinements such as
VE and NoE.
By Proposition 2, we know that the individual rationality
constraints always bind. This can be rewritten for any i ∈ N :∑
j∈B
c
j
i = e
∗
i −
∑
j∈B
f
j(aji , e
∗) = µ(a)i −
∑
j∈B
f
j(aji , µ(a))
Let’s define this quantity as gi(a):
gi(a) = µ(a)i −
∑
j∈B
f
j(aji , µ(a)) (6)
Thus, by re-arranging terms, we can write:
c
j
i = gi(a)−
∑
k 6=j
cki
This becomes an equality constraint in the optimization
problem of principal j. In particular, each principal’s ex-ante
cost can be re-written to be independent of cj .
E[Lj(a
j ;µ(a))] = (7)
∑
i∈N
gi(a)−∑
k 6=j
cki + f
j(aji , µ(a))
 − vj(µ(a))
In light of this observation, we can think of game between
principals as having two parts. On one hand, in the a
parameters, they decide which game to induce among agents,
and what the equilibrium effort levels e∗ should be. On the
other hand, in the c parameters, they divide the expected
gains from the agents accordingly.
Proposition 3 (Simplex of GNE). Let (c, a) be any gener-
alized Nash equilibrium. Then, take any c˜ such that:
c˜
j
i = gi(a)−
∑
k 6=j
c˜ki c˜
j
i ≥ −f
j(aji , µ(a)) (8)
Then (c˜, a) is also a generalized Nash equilibrium. Further-
more, there are no other generalized Nash equilibria with
the same a parameters.
Proof. The change from c to c˜ does not change the a
parameters that optimize Equation (7), and we can see that
Equation (8) ensures that the new (c˜, a) remains feasible for
each principal’s optimization.
B. Failure of variational equilibria as a selection method
Now that we have noted that there is generally not a unique
generalized Nash equilibria, we will show that variational
refinements will not allow us to select among the GNE.
Theorem 1. If one generalized Nash equilibrium is a varia-
tional equilibrium, then all generalized Nash equilibria with
the same a parameters are variational equilibria.
Proof. First, let’s define f˜ j as:
f˜ j(a) =
∑
j∈B
f
j(aji , µ(a))− v
j(µ(a))
Principal j’s ex-ante cost in Equation (2) can be written:
E[Lj(c
j , aj;µ(a))] =
∑
i∈N
c
j
i + f˜
j(a)
Now, let (c, a) be a generalized Nash equilibria and a
variational equilibria. We can see that, for any variation
(c˜, a˜): ∇(c1,a1)E[L1(c
1, a1;µ(a))]
...
∇(cM ,aM )E[LM (c
M , aM ;µ(a))]

⊺
[(c˜, a˜)− (c, a)] =
∑
j∈B
∑
i∈N
(c˜ji − c
j
i ) +
∑
j∈B
∑
i∈N
∂f˜ j
∂a
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣
a
(a˜ji − a
j
i )
Let (c˜, a) be any other GNE with the same a parameters. By
Proposition 3, Equation (8) must be satisfied. Thus:∑
j∈B
∑
i∈N
(c˜ji − c
j
i ) = 0
Additionally, since the a parameters are unchanged, the
second term is 0. Thus: ∇(c1,a1)E[L1(c
1, a1;µ(a))]
...
∇(cM ,aM)E[LM (c
M , aM ;µ(a))]

⊺
[(c˜, a)− (c, a)] = 0
Thus, the simplex of GNEs are all VEs as well.
C. Non-uniqueness of normalized equilibria
Next, we note that normalized equilibria also fail to select
a unique generalized Nash equilibrium. Recall the set of
constraints were given by Equation (5). Thus, the individual
rationality constraint is for each i ∈ N :∑
j∈B
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , µ(a))
)
− µ(a)i ≥ 0
The positivity constraint is for each i ∈ N and j ∈ B:
c
j
i + f
j(aji , µ(a)) ≥ 0
Let:
g˜i(c, a) = −
∑
j∈B
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , µ(a))
)
− µ(a)i
 =
−
∑
j∈B
c
j
i + gi(a)
Here, gi(a) is as defined in Equation (6).
h˜i,j(c, a) = −
(
c
j
i + f
j(aji , µ(a))
)
Thus, our inequality constraints are simply g˜i(c, a) ≤ 0 for
i ∈ N and h˜i,j(c, a) ≤ 0 for i ∈ N and j ∈ B.
Theorem 2. Consider any generalized Nash equilibria where
all payments are positive in expectation. This GNE is a
normalized equilibria for γ1 = γ2 = ... = γN .
Proof. For notational simplicity, let xj = (cj , aj). The first-
order stationarity condition for optimality of principal j is:
∇xjE[Lj(c
j , aj;µ(a))] +
∑
i∈N
λi∇xj g˜i(c, a) (9)
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈B
νi,j∇xj h˜i,j(c, a) = 0
Let f˜ j be as defined in the proof of Theorem 1. Then, the
gradients in Equation (9) can be calculated:
∇xjE[Lj(c
j , aj;µ(a))] =
[
11×N
∂f˜j
∂a
j
1
. . . ∂f˜
j
∂a
j
N
]⊺
(Here, 1m×n denotes the matrix of dimension m×n whose
entries are all 1.) Similarly:
∇xj g˜i(c, a) =
[
0 . . . −1︸︷︷︸
ithpos
. . . 0 ∂gi
∂a
j
1
. . . ∂gi
∂a
j
N
]⊺
Now, consider any generalized Nash equilibria in the relative
interior of the simplex defined by Equation (8). By comple-
mentary slackness, at these interior points, νi,j = 0 for all i
and j. Thus, solving Equation (9) for interior points would
yield λi = 1 as the only possible values for all i.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by applications to data markets, we considered
the multiple-principal, multiple-agents problem with a non-
rivalrous good in this paper. We show that the payment
contracts that have been studied in the literature thus far will,
in the presence of multiple principals, leads to a multiplicity
of equilibria, arising from ambiguity in which principals can
free-ride off the others. This is structurally very different
from situations where there is either a single principal or
a rivalrous good. We have shown that this multiplicity of
equilibria exists even for various refinements of equilibrium
concepts. The proofs provide intuition for why we have this
fundamental degeneracy.
This implies that most existing equilibrium concepts can-
not provide predictions on the outcomes of data markets
emerging today. Prior to this work, we believed that this
multiplicity of equilibria could be addressed by modifications
to the payment contracts. However, in this paper, we showed
that this degeneracy holds even for a general class of payment
contracts, and the proofs of our theorems in this paper
outline technical reasons why. This shows that, in order to
understand the behavior of strategic parties in data markets,
we may need to explore new equilibrium concepts that
provide uniqueness in the settings considered in this paper.
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